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BILLS AND NOTES-HOLDERS IN DUE COURSE-PAYMENT TO AN IMPOSTOR-

Drawer bank drew a check on the plaintiff bank payable to a depositor on
the faith of a withdrawal order purportedly signed by the depositor but
actually forged by an impostor. The impostor forged the indorsement and
cashed the check at defendant bank which received payment from plaintiffdrawee bank. Two years later, upon the death of the impostor, the fraud
was discovered. Plaintiff-drawee bank voluntarily reinstated the drawer
bank's account and, standing in the drawer's shoes, it won a judgment to
have its account with the defendant reinstated. On appeal, held, reversed.
The policy in favor of the free circulation of commercial paper is sufficient
basis in the ordinary case for placing the loss on the drawer as the first
victim of the impostor's swindle. The majority rule that the impostor's
indorsement in the payee's name passes title to a holder in due course is
adopted without subscribing to all of the reasons advanced in its favor.
Dartmouth National Bank of Hanover v. Keene National Bank, 99 N.H.
458, 115 A. (2d) 316 (1955).
This case is probably the first to use commercial policy as a justification
for holding the drawer of a check liable when he has delivered it to an
impostor. It has been recognized as the underlying principle,1 and has
been alluded to before,2 but apparently has never been the basis of a decision.3 Two interpretations of the result reached on the principal case
are possible. One is that the court has developed a new twist to the intent
theory and is saying that in every case the drawer intends to pay the impostor and that, therefore, indorsement by the impostor passes title to a
holder in due course. This interpretation is suggested by the use of the
broad theory of commercial policy together with the adoption of the
intent theory without its double-intent ramifications. If this is the case,

1 See the dissenting opinion in Cohen v. Lincoln Savings Bank, 275 N.Y. 399, 10
N.E. - (2d) 457 (1937).
2 Citizen's Union Nat. Bank v. Terrell, 244 Ky. 16, 50 S.W. (2d) 60 (1932); Forbes
and King v. Espy, Heidelbach and Co., 21 Ohio St. 474 (1871).
3 In Burrows v. Western Union Tel. Co., 86 Minn. 499, 90 N.W. 1111 (1902), the court
came close to using commercial policy as a basis for its decision.
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the court has gone farther than any other in protecting holders of commercial paper and has placed itself at the other extreme from the rule on
impostors as it has evolved in Rhode Island-4' But this interpretation is
largely nullified by the court's later dictum which states that commercial
policy does not justify holding the drawer liable if he has not been negligent and the drawee or indorsee has. If this qualification is meant to
restrict the application of its new modification of the intent theory, the
court has not gone as far as it first seemed, for then its reasoning is similar
to that of cases which use the double-intent rationale, with due care by the
drawer used to show his intent to pay the named payee only.5 On the
other hand, the more accurate interpretation seems to be that this qualification shows the court's reliance on an estoppel theory based on negligence.
Under the intent doctrine, once the drawer's intent is determined, the
exercise of care by the drawee or indorsee is immaterial.6 The court's
qualification, however, looks to the negligence of the drawee as the crucial
factor, and as long as he is not negligent, the drawer will be estopped to
deny the forgery. Furthermore, the court speaks of precluding the drawer
from setting up the forgery as a defense. This is language of estoppel
and is not used by the exponents of the intent theory. 7 Thus, if estoppel
is the theory that is used, the court's reasoning resembles that of the cases
which hold the drawer liable on the theory that, of two innocent persons,
the one who first made possible the loss must suffer.8
As to the standard of care to be exercised by the parties, the court
would apparently require of the drawee or indorsee only that care used
by the particular community in its normal business practices.9 However,
the question of what standard of care to apply to the drawer to determine
if he shall be estopped is not answered. Such a standard for the drawer
would be significant, for though the negligence of the drawee or indorsee
4 Tolman v. American Nat. Bank, 22 R.I. 462, 48 A. 480 (1901), is generally inter•
preted to mean that the drawer intends in all cases to pay the named payee only, and
indorsement by the impostor passes no title and the drawer can recover. See Abel, "The
Impostor Payee: or, Rhode Island Was Right," 1940 Wis. L. REv. 161, 362.
51n Mercantile Nat. Bank of New York v. Silverman, 148 App. Div. 1, 132 N.Y.S.
1017 (1911), the drawer checked on the identity and existence of payees and sent checks
to them designating them by their military rank. In Cohen v. Lincoln Savings Bank,
note l supra, the court said that the drawer had no reason to require further identification of the payee or to suspect fraud. In Palm v. Watt, 7 Hun (14 N.Y.) 317 (1876),
the impostor related intimate knowledge of the family to prove his identity as a lost
relation.
6 Land Title and Trust Co. v. Northwestern Nat. Bank, 196 Pa. 230, 46 A. 420 (1900).
See McKeehan, "The Negotiable Instruments Law (A Review of the Ames-Brewster Controversy)," 41 AM. L. REG. (n.s.) 437 (1902).
7 Halsey v. Bank of New York and Trust Co., 270 N.Y. 134, 200 N.E. 671 (1936),
used the intent theory and stated that when the intended payee signs, his signature is
not invalid as a forgery.
8 United States v. First Nat. Bank of Prague, (10th Cir. 1941) 124 F. (2d) 484; McHenry v. Old Citizen's Nat. Bank, 85 Ohio St. 203, 97 N.E. 395 (1911); Montgomery
Garage Co. v. Manufacturer's Liability Ins. Co., 94 N.J.L. 152, 109 A. 296 (1920).
9 Cf. McHenry v. Old Citizen's Nat. Bank, note 8 supra.
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is the important point, if they are negligent they are liable only if the
drawer has used due care. Some courts would consider the issuance to
the impostor as negligeni;:e per se and estop the drawer,10 some require
the negligence to be the proximate cause of the drawee's loss,11 and some
that it set off a train of events leading to the loss.12 Though failing to set
any new pattern of liability, if estoppel is the theory of the court, the
decision aids the free circulation of negotiable paper by placing in the
bank's or indorsee's hands the means of its own salvation, for as long as it
is not negligent it will not be liable. It is hard to see how such a rule can
hinder the negotiability of paper. On the other hand, if a rebuttable
presumption of intention to pay the impostor is the theory, the verdict
has done little to aid commercial policy for it makes the drawee liable
regardless of the care it uses, so long as the drawer can argue (by showing
his own use of due care) that he intended to pay the named payee only.
This rationale tends to make drawees and indorsees overly cautious in
accepting commercial paper for it puts the determinative factor of liability
out of their control.
Thomas S. Erickson

10 Santa Maria v. Industrial City Bank and Banking Co., 326 Mass. 440, 95 N.E. (2d)
176 (1950); Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Cohn Co., 164 Ark. 335, 261 S.W. 895 (1924).
11 Allan Ware Pontiac, Inc. v. First Nat. Bank of Shreveport, (La. App. 1941) 2 S.
(2d) 76.
12 Security-First Nat. Bank of Los Angeles v. United States, (9th Cir. 1939) 103 F.
(2d) 188.

